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Opportunity and risk are twins.
An investigation into algorithms.
by Katherine WIDOMSKI
Algorithms will free up people’s time to do other things, much like computers have
freed people from paper calculations. The depth and breadth of the application of
algorithms is best understood through a task-based automation model. An algo-
rithm cannot replace all of the duties of a certain, perhaps even cognitively taxing
job; however, an algorithm can be used to automate many of the so-called individ-
ual tasks. Their ability to replace physical tasks is more limited. An algorithm can
also be used to perform certain tasks to a higher quality in a shorter period of time
than a person. Algorithms may globally become the ultimate productivity boost for
advanced economies. Hence, it is recommended that people learn to work with al-
gorithms, instead of against them. In addition, by combining human creativity with
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Why tasks? Why algorithms? Why
work at all?
If natural phenomena have an air of
"necessity" about them in their
subservience to natural law, artificial
phenomena have an air of
"contingency" in their malleability by
environment.
Herbert Simon
1.1 A short introduction
The robots are not coming for us. Not yet. However, algorithms will be the first
widespread cognitive augmentation of the human intellect1. It will usher in a new
era of automation.
Before the industrial revolution, there were artisans (Richardson, 2008). During the
industrial revolution, there were Luddites; and the Luddites were right, the ma-
chines did take their jobs (O’Rourke et al., 2013)2. In fact, it took around sixty years
before the benefits of the industrial revolution finally reached the average worker
in the United Kingdom (Feinstein, 1998).3 That is a long time. Korinek & Stiglitz
1Although the internet gave us the information and communication superhighway, in how we har-
ness algorithms they will analyze, sort, process, and form information for us.
2Hobsbawm (1952, p.59) terms this "collective bargaining by riot.”, claiming it was not about hos-
tility towards machines but the consequence of the machines to their livelihoods; a technique of trade
unionism.
3When discussing the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom, it is important to place events
in historical context. There were many simultaneous difficult circumstances: an unprecedented dou-
bling of the population of England and Wales (Chambers & Mingay, 1966), a succession of harvest
failures caused by abnormal weather conditions (Chambers & Mingay, 1966), not to mention wars
with France which withdrew thousands of men from civilian labour (Mokyr & Savin, 1976), created
inflationary financial conditions (Mokyr & Savin, 1976), and stimulated some sectors while disrupting
others (Mokyr & Savin, 1976). Some could compare these to similarly difficult circumstances faced by
the world today.
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(2017) are concerned with saving humanity from Malthusian destiny. Frey & Os-
borne (2013) have dire warnings about 47 percent of current job types. So will it
take sixty years for us to adjust to algorithms? Perhaps algorithms are merely the
evolution of digitalization, if the first step was the widespread implementation of
personal computers and the huge ramifications that combined with immediate ac-
cess to communication and information through the world wide web, the internet.
Although displacement is a serious concern for labour worldwide, it is not the only
answer.
What the world is facing now is not a world where a robot surgeon performs heart
surgery, replacing the human surgeon. It rather is the augmentation of the human
surgeon through computer-enhanced instruments which provide "superhuman dex-
terity through tremor filtration and motion scaling that are capable of precise manip-
ulation in confined body cavities" (Zenati, 2001, p.1). Both physical and cognitive
augmentation is the true power of the algorithmic revolution. This augmentation is
here presented as best understood through a task-based model.
An algorithm is an ordered and finite set of operations that must be followed in order
to solve a problem (Gersting, & Schneider 1995). Its purpose is to solve a problem,
which means that it has a defined objective. So, what are algorithms doing? For ex-
ample, algorithms are completing tasks. These tasks are the smallest identifiable es-
sential piece that serves as a unit of work. A job is then a series of tasks that a worker
performs. These tasks may be the same or they may evolve over time. This perspec-
tive differs from the technology augmenting perspective of "skills", where a skill is
"a worker’s endowment of capabilities for performing various tasks" (Açemoǧlu &
Autor, 2011, p. 1045).
Workers apply their skills to tasks and produce outputs in exchange for wages. In
the past, the endowment of skills was how workers were judged, with high and low
skilled workers as different cases in task-based models (Açemoǧlu & Autor, 2011).
By moving this logic from skills to tasks, a more highly skilled worker becomes a
worker that can perform a higher variety, or range, of tasks. These tasks can change
in response to labour conditions and augmentation by technology. A worker that
can adjust to working alongside algorithms is the particular case that I will propose
in this investigation.
This work proceeds as follows: in chapter two I discuss at length a model of task-
based automation by Açemoǧlu & Restrepo, their interpretation of the problem, and
my own interpretation as well. I also discuss in part the model of task-based au-
tomation as presented by Korinek & Stiglitz, and their conclusions. Naturally, I add
my own.
In chapter three I discuss algorithms at length. I define important algorithms present
in discourse today, how they are used, how they are combined, and the implications
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to the labour force, to local, and to global economies of this shift. I also discuss
empirics of what is happening now, and how this process is accelerating.
In chapter four I present policy observations and policy recommendations for dif-
ferent nations, both developed and developing, for handling a new, "algorithmic"
future. I also discuss the shortcomings of algorithms and of narrow intelligences,
and how human labour will remain relevant, if not crucial, for decades to come,
especially in the realm of working with algorithms.
In the conclusion I pull all these parts together around my central argument: that we
will work with algorithms, and that they will revolutionize the future of work.
1.2 Working papers
I have conducted an extensive literature review on the economics of algorithms,
artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the implications of a world economy, and the
labour market. The generation affected by a potentially massive change is quickly
growing and often exploratory. Although published works exist, and are referred to,
they are dated. The subject moves quickly. Ideas move quickly. A canonical model
has yet to be formed, although it looks to be the idea of the task-based automation
model. I acknowledge that this could be considered a weakness in my work and
ask for it to be considered a strength instead. Great minds are working on this.
They are processing their ideas through models, philosophies, ideas, implications,
consequences, and more, even if John Maynard Keynes or Herbert Simon or Alan




A model of task based automation
...we may say that the artificial object
imitates the real by turning the same
face to the outer system, by adapting,
relative to the same goals, to
comparable ranges of external tasks.
Herbert Simon
In this chapter, I outline and discuss a task-based automation model proposed in
Restrepo and Açemoglu’s (2018) working paper. This model uses a Cobb-Douglas
production function with machines and labour as the two inputs, where different
tasks are conducted by different inputs. Included in my discussion and critique of
the model are the changes I propose to better understand the world where humans
work by harnessing algorithms. The core argument is that there will be multitudes
of tasks that can only be completed with the combination of algorithms and labour.
This production function would be an interesting measure of the degree of automa-
tion in an economy, and perhaps form the basis with which you could compare and
contrast different nations’ levels of automation and adoption of algorithms. After
all, human beings and algorithms working together can create an entirely new fu-
ture. If the human mind is the ultimate resource, combining the mind with ultimate
narrow intelligence sounds like we are strapping ourselves into a mental accelerator
of fantastic proportions.
2.0.1 On algorithms
An algorithm is defined as a separate input to labour, as an algorithm is not entirely
labour replacing. As defined earlier, an algorithm is an ordered and finite set of op-
erations that must be followed in order to solve a problem (Gersting, & Schneider
1995). Its purpose is to solve a problem, which means that it has a defined objec-
tive. Algorithms and labour are not interchangeable factors, as most algorithms
need labour to work with or alongside it (Seamans & Raj, 2018). For example, a
machine learning algorithm that uses natural language processing to read contracts
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cannot also find clients, nor can it participate in meetings to convince people to hire
the said algorithm (Alarie et al., 2017). For that, you would need a human being
working with an algorithm, as it can complete certain aspects of a profession, that is
to take on tasks. It could be that by taking on these tasks or opening the opportunity
to creating brand-new tasks, this may redefine the profession. Much like dishwash-
ers that do not wash dishes in the way that human beings wash them, algorithms
perform tasks in an entirely different manner to human labour. Thus, a model of
task-based automation a good starting point to how the widespread adoption of al-
gorithms in advanced, and even less advanced, countries’ economies will affect the
world economy. This does raise the question of displacement of human labour.
2.0.2 Displacement?
In the past, a job was considered in its whole (even if there are heterogeneities in job
titles, see Frey & Osborne, 2013). However, with the changes in the labour market,
the rise of skill-sharing, of the gig economy, there has been in a shift in modelling
from skills to tasks, where these parts described as tasks are best understood through
a task-based automation model . A task is the smallest identifiable essential pieces
that serve as a unit of work (Açemoglu & Autor, 2011).
If we shift understanding from skills to tasks, then a person’s displacement in the job
market is not absolute. The person is merely nudged to one side, in some aspects.
This notion creates what Açemoǧlu and Restrepo (2018), p.1 term the displacement
effect "... a decoupling of wages and output per worker, and a decline in the share of
labor in national income”.
If this displacement effect does not only unlink wages and output per worker but
then also lead to a decline in the share that workers have in national income, this has
important implications for inequality. The authors Korinek & Stiglitz (2017) address
this in part, which will be covered later in the chapter.
So although automation, algorithms, and AI are productivity enhancing, they can
also be in part labour-replacing, especially when viewed from the perspective of
tasks rather than skills, as modelled here with task-based automation. To finish,
these ideas, like many large notions, are not new to great minds. To quote Wassily
Leontief: “Any worker who now performs his task by following specific instructions
can, in principle, be replaced by a machine. This means that the role of humans as the
most important factor of production is bound to diminish—in the same way that the
role of horses in agricultural production was first diminished and then eliminated
by the introduction of tractors.” (Leontief, 1983, p.3)
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which details an economy where the output is an aggregate function Y of the tasks
x. This type of framework appeared in an earlier model of Açemoǧlu & Autor (2011)
where they considered a static environment with a single final good, a closed econ-
omy, and no trade in tasks (itself an interesting concept). This final good is produced







where Y denotes the output of a unique final good, with y(i) the production level of
task i. constructing a model as such shows output, or final goods, as the product of
tasks performed by workers of varying capacity. Açemoǧlu & Autor (2011) model
only have workers performing tasks, while Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) also have
"machines" aka capital performing tasks. The next iteration I would recommend is
to consider the combination of labour and capital, or how algorithm can indeed
augment human labour, and to consider this an individual input. That production
function in itself would be an interesting measure of how automated an economy is
becoming, for example to compare what continuum or range of tasks is taken on by
only machines, by only humans, and by the combination of algorithms and humans.
Looking deeper into the construction of the model, Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018)
also refer to Zeira (1998). In Zeira’s paper from 20 years ago (!), he has a single good
Y which is used for both consumption and investment. This good is produced by an
intermediate good X, produced by labour and capital.
Y = aX (2.3)
Zeira’s 1998 paper considers productivity differences across different nations, and
thus he introduces the augmenting parameter a which is the productivity parameter
that may differ across various nations around the world. He considers two types of
inputs, one low technology with low level labour, and one high technology with high
level labour. Thus, the model of task-based automation as presented in the latest
paper by Restrepo and Açemoǧlu draws upon a model built to compare differences
both within a nation, and between nations. That kind of basis then lends itself well
to both discussion about augmentation of labour by algorithms (for example, the
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productivity measure a on the intermediate good X could be modelled as a measure
of the degree of adoption of algorithms in different nations).
Zeira’s 1998 paper is also curiously relevant in that it details the productivity dif-
ferences in countries with differing levels of capital. This framework of thinking is
informative to the current paper’s model in terms of determining who will own the
algorithms, if algorithms are considered to be capital rather than technology or if
algorithms are something that can be owned.1
Going back to Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018), they proceed to define a task x as
within the range:
x 2 [N   1, N] (2.4)
Definining it as such frees the authors from the real number range imposed in the
original model by Açemoǧlu and Autor (2011) whereby:
i 2 [0, 1] (2.5)
that is, that the continuum of tasks belonged to a limited range between 0 and 1.
As Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) acknowledge in their paper, adjusting the range
gives them the freedom to add or remove tasks to the continuum without needing
to alter the range of tasks from which the production function draws.
But what is a task? If x denotes a task, this is considered the smallest identifiable
essential piece that can be considered a unit of work. A task could be sending an
email, finding statistics for a report, laying a tile, reading a contract, finding some-
one’s medical records, and a profession or a job is made up of a series of tasks. Tasks
are the smallest building blocks of an economy, perhaps these blocks that fit together
to form different professions.
In Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) each task can be produced by human labor, l(x),
or by machines, m(x). The productivity of the type of input is represented by gL(x)





gL(x)l(x) + gM(x)m(x) if x 2 [0, I]
gL(x)l(x) if x 2 [I, N]
(2.6)
1There is much to be said here about cryptocurrency. Previously, capital was "controlled" by the
government, in the sense that the government ultimately decided how much money there was in an
economy. With the rise of cryptocurrency, the ’amount’ is not set in the same way. This is a similar
concept to the ownership of algorithms. Will they be owned by governments? Corporations? Open-
source? A combination? How will you buy and trade them? Do they depreciate like normal capital?
Can developing countries obtain a unique foothold if the currency for creating algorithms is not ini-
tially money, but minds? Answering these questions could be an entire body of work on its own.
However, this is beyond the purpose of the current body of work.
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Productivity is output per hour of a task (Autor & Salomons, 2018). There are varied
outputs per hour of the individual factors and of the combined factor of production.
This is explained by labour performing tasks differently to algorithms, and again
the combination of labour and algorithms performing tasks in another manner again
than just labour would or just algorithms would. The tried and tested example of
how a dishwasher washes dishes differently to a human being is an analogy to what
informs this distinction.
Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) assume that productivity of labour, gL(x) is increas-
ing and that the ratio between the productivity of labour and machines is increas-
ing in (x), thus giving labour a comparative advantage in higher-indexed tasks.
The authors note that their framework builds on Zeira(1998) where he models how
the difference of the rate of adoption of capital-intensive production methods am-
plify productivity differences across different nations and across time. Restrepo and
Açemoǧlu (2018) build on this logic to show that the rate of adoption of what they
term machines, which is what I term algorithms, could result in four different types
of technological advances, and how these advances impact the demand for labour
and wages.
Although this framework is valuable in the discussion of the either/or situation, it
misses out on discussing what I believe is the most valuable and informative case:
the case of algorithms necessarily working with humans. I believe there are tasks,
and perhaps in the future entire professions, that depend on the combination of
labour and algorithms. This can be observed now with the necessary skill of using
a personal computer for working in most middle-class, white-collar roles. I propose
that algorithms will play this role in the future, that to work in a world with algo-
rithmic labour, human labour will work alongside and necessarily with algorithms.
I also propose that this case, for example it could be termed:
gZ(x)z(x) if x 2 (I, F) (2.7)
The range of tasks x 2 (I, F) would lie between the previous two cases. Thus, on
the lower end of the continuum would lie tasks best performed or best suitable to
algorithms, in the middle is the combination, and on the end are tasks that can only
be performed by humans. The size of these ranges as relative to one another would
give insight then into the level of automation of an economy, and perhaps those tasks
that are performed by both humans and algorithms could show the healthy side of
automation, where humans are not only being replaced. The combination of human
and algorithm tasks are placed in the middle of the task continuum to reflect an idea
that tasks that can be exclusively performed by labour without algorithmic presence
will be highly specialized, equivalent to higher productivity or higher wage tasks,
and that the wage paid to labour in labour only tasks WH > WZ. Labour in this
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model is supplied in the case of with and without algorithms, and thus there are
two expressions for labour.
In Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) the assumption is that tasks now performed by
algorithms (machines) could be performed by labour as well, in the sense that com-
plex calculations were possible before Matlab, just much more tedious. Certainly, by
freeing economists from tedious statistical calculations using advanced econometric
methods that can harness machine learning, for example, more or different data can
be analyzed. Perhaps this could be an argument for why the continuum perhaps
should be sorted with algorithms and labour combined being on the higher side.
In their model, Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) denote the equilibrium wage rate by
W and the equilibrium cost of machines by R, familiar terms for the price of labour
and capital. Their equilibrium prescribes that firms choose the cost-minimization










The second inequality implies that all tasks in [N1,I] will be produced by machines.
The first inequality implies that the introduction of new tasks—an increase in N—will
increase aggregate output. This assumption is imposed on the wage to rental rate
ratio, which is an endogenous object. According to the empirical work performed
by Autor & Salomons (2018) following this model, the assumption of wage rations
has no bearing on reality as their analysis is silent on new task creation. However,
this assumption also implies that capital is more cost-effective than labor in newly
automated tasks, which would mean tasks could tend more to the automated.
Y = B
⇣ K





Then output Y in equilibrium is a product of the different relative productivities and










B is a collection of terms that encompass productivities of the different factor inputs.
As commented by Autor & Salomons, conventionally this result corresponds to Total
Factor Productivity (TFP), which can then shift depending on if one or both of the
efficiency terms gM(x) or gL(x) change, or because tasks are reallocated from one
factor input to another. As the authors note, as distinct from the canonical Solow
model, TFP growth in this setting is not Hicks-neutral if it stems from movements in
either I or N.
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Through this equilibrium result, by taking derivatives at the margins, Restrepo and
Açemoǧlu (2018) map out the displacement effect but argue that this is counteracted








Productivity effect > 0
(2.11)
Restrepo and Açemoǧlu (2018) claim that without the productivity effect, automa-
tion would always reduce labor demand, because it is directly replacing labor in
tasks that were previously performed by workers. They argue that if the produc-
tivity effect is limited, automation will reduce labor demand and wages. Autor &
Salomons (2018) take this analysis further to suggest two channesl through which
this productivity effect may operate. The first, more direct effect is that automation
may increase labour demand in non-automated tasks in an industry where automa-
tion is taking place. They call the ‘Uber’ effect, i.e., a technological improvement
that both raises labor productivity and employment in the affected sector. Another
productivity effect, this one considered indirect, would be that productivity growth
in a technologically advancing industry may raise labour demand in other indus-
tries through rising consumer incomes and boosting final demand. They term this
the ‘Walmart’ effect as automation lowers input costs to downstream customer in-
dustries, leading to output and employment growth.
Finally, Autor & Salomons (2018) discuss an avenue by which technological change
may affect output and wages: through the creation of new tasks in which labor has
comparative advantage. that is, a rise in N. An important distinction, and certainly
a method for which labour can argue its relevance.
However, as noted earlier, alongside some equations in Appendix B, what this model
and other interpretations or empirical work performed using this framework lack is
an understanding of the necessary combination and possibilities of humans working
with algorithms. Much like this master’s thesis could not be completed without
access to the internet or access to a computer, algorithms will become a necessary
part of the future workforce. The question is how to harness them, and how to
model this appropriately, and not just through the lens of either or. Displacement is
not the only answer.
2.1.1 Korinek & Stiglitz
Korinek & Stiglitz, 2017, model task-based automation in a different manner. They
are especially concerned with whether or not innovation in the algorithm space, or
as they call it, AI, will be labour-augmenting or labour-saving. They link this to a
given wage and flesh out a model around that.
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The authors discuss that advances in AI could be considered a continuing evolution
of a long process of automation that started with the industrial revolution. They also
note others, myself included, who emphasize that AI critically differs from past in-
ventions. We have yet to invent something that could make us completely obsolete.
James Barrat (2013) calls this our final invention.
They also address an important idea: that productivity-enhancing technologies have
previously always increased overall labour demand, not to mention how labour’s
share of national income has remained roughly constant (Jones and Romer, 2010), a
notion even Keynes himself (1939) deemed a bit of a miracle. Algorithms, robotics,
and AI could be the first case to overwhelmingly prove that wrong (Autor & Sa-
lomons, 2018). However, they don’t consider how human beings will work with
algorithms, only the "instead of" case. I believe this is a misnomer and a misunder-
standing of how freeing human labour and combining it with the processing, calcu-
lating, predictive, and analytical power of different algorithms could be the ultimate
productivity enhancer.
However, this is not reflected in the empirics (Autor & Salomons, 2018). Measured
productivity seems to have increased rather slowly in recent years. If innovations
related to algorithms and artificial intelligence enter the economy at the same slow
pace as suggested by recent productivity statistics, then the transition will poten-
tially be even slower than the wave of mechanization in the 1950 – 1970s (Korinek
Stiglitz, 2017). I disagree with the authors that then this means the disruptions may
not be that significant. Indeed, empirics as discussed later indicate the opposite.
The main argument in Korinek Stiglitz, (2017) revolves around Pareto-improving
transfers. They suggest, for example, changes in patent length and capital taxation
which could act as a device to redistribute to displaced workers. Their first best
alternative is lump sum transfers between displaced workers and the innovators
behind the algorithms. Certainly, there is the question of who could afford the goods
and services created by algorithms and robots in a future where many workers are
displaced.
For Stiglitz & Korinek (2017), for example, they outline how in the short run, the ad-
ditional unit of machine labour added to an economy would earn its marginal prod-
uct while simultaneously redistributing income from labour to traditional capital in
that it alters the ratio between the two. This of course is not taking into consider-
ation my main point throughout this thesis that algorithms and human labour will
necessarily work better together, and to a degree need each other.
What Korinek Stiglitz, (2017) offer is a different perspective on task-based automa-
tion and its implications on the future labour market, which combined with empirics
from Autor & Salomons, (2018) suggest that the potential productivity increase from
the increased adoption of automation and algorithms is yet to appear.
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2.1.2 A note on capital: will algorithms be considered capital, labour, or
technology?
Often in these models, algorithms are defined as capital in the sense that they could
be considered machines, or could be bought and sold, or are owned by companies,
which to a degree makes sense when trying to model a fairly new idea into strict
concepts of the factors of production. However, I would argue that algorithms are
unlike previous factors of production. Although companies can own algorithms,
algorithms can also be substituted for human labour at least in the sense of certain
tasks, a range which is only growing. Unlike a machine that perhaps replaced a
human being on a car production line, an algorithm could learn and grow, and create
entirely new possibilities. It is almost like a capital that could invest in itself. Perhaps
human capital is another lens through which to perceive algorithms. In any case,
algorithms are certainly unusual. As is the definition of capital.
Capital has been a tenuous question in economics before. The great Joan Robinson
in her 1953 treatise on The Production Function and the Theory of Capital raises
many important questions about the notion of capital, about the particular list of
objects it can entail, and about how different individuals may perceive those objects
as different even if the good has the same type of description. But her question of
capital in terms of cost or value is what I feel is relevant here. How will we value
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If they find a parrot who could answer
to everything, I would claim it to be an
intelligent being without hesitation.
Denis Diderot
3.1 What we talk about, when we talk about algorithms
Terms like AI, algorithms, machine learning, and natural language processing are
littered throughout this work. Consequently, some clear definitions of what these
terms are, and how they are used, will now be presented.
Many narrow intelligences, or algorithms, are inspired by the human nervous sys-
tem and the human mind. Despite this, they operate quite differently than humans.
It may become a tired example, but the logic is solid: much like how a dishwasher
does not wash dishes like a human being, a deep learning algorithm cannot tell the
difference between a Samoyed and a Pomeranian in an image like a person would
(Le Cun et al., 2015).
Much like the dishwasher and other modern appliances revolutionized everyday
life at home, "...twenty-first century AI enables a constellation of mainstream tech-
nologies that are having a substantial impact on everyday lives" (LeCun et al., 2015,
p. 436). From asking a speaker such as Amazon Alexa or Google Home or on an
iPhone, Siri, what the weather is like today (and getting a correct answer), to self-
driving automobiles like the Tesla model X, to robots that perform backflips (Boston
Dynamics), they are becoming a part of our mundane reality.
3.1.1 Artificial Intelligence
Throughout this work, I talk about AI through the lens of many narrow, specialized
intelligences (e.g., machine learning, neural language processing, deep learning, im-
age recognition). This is because AI is not is a generalized type of intelligence. There
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FIGURE 3.1: An example of a map of the current state of algorithms
as they map to AI. Source: Oracle report on chatbots (2017)
is no AI that compares to the human mind; in AI terms, this is called Artificial Gen-
eral Intelligence (AGI) (Goertzel, 2007).
For AGI to exist, I agree with Monica Anderson, who believes that AGI cannot be
created through models, or through reductions. She argues that current, narrow AI
is much like Kahneman’s System Two of thinking. She proposes that true AGI lies
in creating something that is more alike Kahneman’s System One: Intuitive AI 1
What is the power of AI? Agrawal et al. (2017) argue that it is a predictive machine
like no other. However, this seems to be a limiting concepts of the true capabilities
of artificial intelligence, or algorithms. After all, human intelligence is not merely
predicated on the ability to predict. It also includes the ability to create, to synthe-
size, to empathize, to understand, to learn, to grow, to process, to move, perhaps
even to love and to forgive.
3.1.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a field that develops algorithms for predictions, classifications,
and the clustering or grouping of tasks. Machine Learning involves training algo-
rithms on large data sets to find patterns, programming computers to optimise a per-
formance criterion using example data or past experience. (Alpaydin, 2010). There
are two main branches of machine learning: supervised and unsupervised.
A supervised machine learning algorithm uses set inputs, for example features or
covariates to predict an outcome (Athey, 2018). As noted in a somewhat snarky
image later, when it comes to the term prediction for machine learning, it is not
1See Monica Anderson’s rather amazing array of work. This topic is sadly much too broad to fit
into this body of work.
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about forecasting, but rather about using training data to "teach" the algorithm to
find the predicted outcome.
There are many applications of machine learning taking on tasks (e.g., reviewing
legal documents). The Heretik website (i.e., https://www.heretik.com) is an exam-
ple of just this. More specifically, “Heretik is a relativity application that marries
effective text analysis machine learning models and flexible document review capa-
bilities."
Machine learning is not a method that is necessarily new to econometrics. Varian
(2014) discusses how econometric methods have much to gain from machine learn-
ing, for example with prediction. As he notes on page five, "Econometricians, statis-
ticians, and data mining specialists are generally looking for insights that can be
extracted from the data. Machine learning specialists are often primarily concerned
with developing high-performance computer systems that can provide useful pre-
dictions in the presence of challenging computational constraints."
Machine learning is closely related to data mining, a method employed by the Aus-
tralian Taxation Office (ATO) to detect fraudulent tax statements (ATO, 2015).
The other field of machine learning is called unsupervised ML, which involves find-
ing clusters of observations that are similar in terms of their covariates. For exam-
ple, if a computer scientist used an unsupervised ML algorithm to categorize what
content appeared in videos, and when a human being judged the largest group of
videos, they determined that most of the videos contained a specific type of content,
for example cat videos. This is referred to as “unsupervised” because there were
no “labels” on any of the images in the input data; only after examining the items
in each group does an observer determine that the algorithm found cats or dogs
(Athey, 2018).
In my view, these tools are very useful as an intermediate step in empirical work
in economics. They provide a data-driven way to find similar newspaper articles,
restaurant reviews, etc., and thus create variables that can be used in economic anal-
yses."
An example of ML in use is by the fantastic paper by Mann & Puttman on the benign
effects of automation. Puttman wrote an algorithm2 to classify all five million U.S.
patents granted between 1976 and 2014 as automation or non-automation patents.
The authors documented a rise in the share of automation patents from 25 percent
to 67 percent. They find a positive effect of automation on total employment, driven
by job growth in the service sector, which compensates for a fall in manufacturing
employment (Mann & Puttman, 2017). What a fantastic example of human beings
working with algorithms!
2I had ambitions of requesting an algorithm to read papers for this investigation, thus proving the
use of ML in economic research. However, I ran out of time. I look forward to using those techniques
in the future.
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FIGURE 3.2: A comment on Machine Learning...
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3.1.3 Deep Learning
Deep learning is a field of machine learning which builds upon the techniques de-
scribed above to a greater layer of complexity through "nets". It is often termed "con-
volutional neural networks" To quote one of the giants of the Artificial Intelligence
field, Geoffrey Hinton:
"Deep learning allows computational models that are composed of multiple process-
ing layers to learn representations of data with multiple levels of abstraction...Deep
learning discovers intricate structure in large data sets by using the backpropaga-
tion algorithm to indicate how a machine should change its internal parameters that
are used to compute the representation in each layer from the representation in the
previous layer." (LeCun et al., 2015, p4)
The deep in deep learning refers to the hidden layers present in the neural network.
"Deep learning refers to the strategy of using architectures with many hidden layers
to tackle difficult problems, including vision."(Kriegeskorte, 2015, pp.4).
DL methods have dramatically improved a number of fields previously considered
very challenging to artificial intelligence: speech recognition, visual object recogni-
tion, object detection (Esteva et al., 2017). Deep convolutional nets have brought
about breakthroughs in processing images, video, speech and audio.
Deep Learning is often applied in conjunction with Machine Learning or Natural
Language Processing in fields by various startups in the legal tech space, that is
where entrepreneurs create algorithms to read contracts, write contracts, read law,
analyze cases, and other tasks previously considered grunt work or taken on by law
interns or paralegals (Alarie et al., 2015).
FIGURE 3.3: An example of image classification by a deep convolu-
tional neural network, from LeCun et al., 2015
3.1.4 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a framework that shifts the focus of machine learning
from pattern recognition to experience-driven sequential decision-making. It is a set
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of methods that allows a machine to be fed with raw data and to automatically dis-
cover the representations needed for detection or classification. RL is in fact familiar
to economists, for it roughly lines up with dynamic programming (Athey, 2018). It
promises to carry AI applications forward toward taking actions in the real world
(Stone et al., 2016).
RL could assist in providing a normative account of how agents may optimize their
control of an environment. An early version RL has been used by Game Theorists
within economics to map strategic decisions (Erev & Roth, 1998). To use RL in
situations approaching a semblance of real-world complexity, this presents a diffi-
cult task as agents must derive representations of the environment from their high-
dimensional sensory inputs, and then use these to generalize past experience to new
situations.(Mnih et al., 2015). A great weakness of algorithms is generalizing any
kind of information. Algorithms are narrow intelligences. Human beings and the
human mind provides the generalization.
3.1.5 A comment on the term "learning"
Many algorithms call themselves "learning": Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Re-
inforcement Learning, however these are not "learning" in the true, human sense of
the word. With great respect paid to Alan Turing, perhaps the originator of ideas of
Artificial Intelligence. His comment in his paper from 1953 removes the philosophy
and the ambiguity of the concept thinking. When he proposes that we consider the
question "Can machines think?", he rightfully so adjusted in the imitation game to
what a machine may do given a specific situation and specific parameters. Algo-
rithms do not generalize. Machines do not generalize. Algorithms, can however,
predict, and this can be mistaken for generalization.
3.1.6 Natural Language Processing
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is an example of an algorithm that could also
be called text analytics. NLP helps computers interpret, understand, and then use
everyday human language and language patterns, by extracting high quality of in-
formation from text (Feldman, & Dagan, 1995) It breaks both speech and text down
into shorter components and interprets these more manageable blocks to understand
what each individual component means and how it contributes to the overall mean-
ing (Liddy, 2001). Through NLP our AI can transcribe consultations, summarise
clinical records and chat with users in a more natural, human way (Babylon, 2018).
NLP has wide applications, from medicine to law to economics. Plenty of differ-
ent law-tech startups claim that their NLP algorithms can summarize thousands of
pages of legal documents in minutes. Although there are claims that it reduces the
probability of error, of course this assumes that the original way that the application
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was coded was correct and that the algorithm was trained with sufficient data and a
sufficient variety of data (McGinnis et al., 2014).
NLP techniques are also called text mining. An example of text mining used in
economics is by Siegel, 2018, who uses NLP to analyze financial reports of different
medium and large corporations in Germany. The algorithm first prepares the text
by tokenization, that is to divide the text into sentences and tokens (words). Then
she codes what the algorithm is searching for: terms like development, or sections
of text that describe observations or predictions of the future. Finally, the algorithm
is trained to structure this text in a way that an economist would find the summaries
valuable.
3.1.7 Computer Vision
Computer vision is an example of machine perception. With the advent of afford-
able, large-scale computing, the availability of large datasets, and refineements of
neural network algorithms has led to dramatic improvements in performance on
benchmark tasks. In fact, there are now some narrowly defined visual classification
tasks that can be performed more accurately by computer vision than by human be-
ings (Sankaranarayanan et al., 2018). Much current research is focused on automatic
image and video captioning (Stone et al., 2015).
Computer vision is the type of algorithm that is looking to replace professions such
as dermatologists or radiologists. In a a paper by Esteva et al., 2017, they present a
CNN which is trained using a dataset of over 129 000 images that document over
2000 different diseases. They test this algorithm’s performance against 21 board-
certified dermatologists using images that were confirmed later by biopsy. The CNN
achieved performance on par with all tested experts, demonstrating that an algo-
rithm in a specific context trained on specific data could display competence on par
with dermatologists. The authors suggest that mobile devices can potentially extend
the reach of dermatologists outside of the clinic, as most individuals in developed
countries now have access to a smartphone, and thus this could democratize vital
diagnostic care by making it accessible to more individuals 3.
3.2 What drives these algorithms?
What drives the algorithms?
• data
• processing power
3It would be interesting to document how different highly skilled professionals experience algo-
rithms encroaching upon their expertise and their vision for the future of their field
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FIGURE 3.4: An example of how Natural Language Processing ana-
lyzes text.
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FIGURE 3.5: A Deep CNN layout for classifying skin lesions from
Esteva et al., 2017
• high-speed internet
Concepts behind the algorithms I have detailed above are not necessarily new, but
what has triggered the explosion of progress to the degree that we are discussing a
potential for replacement of human labour are the three factors outlined above: data,
processing power, and high-speed internet. Access to these meant a wide variety
of long-standing problems in ML, AI, and computer vision saw improvements to
the extent that they broke through long-standing performance barriers (Lemley co.,
2017).
Humankind generates and collects more data today than ever before (Domo, 2018).
Data is generated by social media use, by appliances connected to the internet, by
loyalty programs at stores, by exercise tracking applications on smartphones, by
applications that track female fertility or menstrual cycles, by genealogy websites,
and by internet history (Domo, 2018). There is a never-ending array of data points
that are generated, collected, and potentially capitalized upon. The old adage of ‘if
the product is free, what theye are selling is you,’ only gets truer with time. Some
researchers predict that the total amount of data generated annually by any device
could reach 163 zettabytes (one zettabyte is equal to 270 bytes) by 2025 (Reinsel,
Gantz, Rydning, 2017).
3.2.1 Disruption
Algorithms are disruptive. They are disruptive to how we think about capital, they
are disruptive to how we think about labour, they are disrupting the future of work.
The disruptive nature of algorithms and their combination of narrow intelligences
into AI is difficult to structure neatly into a mathematical model. The movement
feels at times equivalent to when the fish crawled out of the sea.
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3.2.2 Demand for labour in the world of algorithms
There is a considerable fear around algorithms replacing labour. This is much of the
focus of the work by many authors when discussing automation, algorithms, and
artificial intelligence. The disruptions generated by depend on whether they are
labor-augmenting or labor-saving, whether at a given wage, the innovations lead to
more or less demand for labor (Korinek Stiglitz, 2017).
In modern, advanced economies (and to a lesser extent, but still relevant to less ad-
vanced economies) computers changed the workforce completely. Internet access
has changed it again. Now, the speed and breadth of internet availability, the ex-
pected connectedness of co-workers, of managers, and the level of employment that
is service based, and especially services which can be delivered remotely, implies
that change can go in an entirely unimagined direction. It is difficult to see the pos-
sibilities before they exist, and difficult to predict the complexities of the upcoming
changes.
3.2.3 Let’s get hyper-specialized
Sometimes I feel that the age of the generalist is dead. A PhD, in many degrees, is a
tiny, tiny piece of knowledge carved from a hill, placed on a pile, that is often never
read again. PhD graduates become the queens and kings of the tiniest domains.
The new professions created for, with, and alongside algorithms could reinvigorate
the generalist. Instead of being valued for knowing specific knowledge (or knowing
how to find it), if an algorithm reads papers and spits out information, what does the
human being working with it do? They create! If the essence of the intelligence of
the human mind, what is still difficult to mimic by an algorithm, is creativity, what
better way to hypercreate than to have all the inputs prepared for you.
If some people code the algorithms, others test them, and algorithms test them some
more, then there exists many new professions in this explosion of intelligence and
creation that may well await us. That is, if people have access to the algorithms. I of-
ten wonder if corporations will replace governments. The question of the ownership
of algorithms is a crucial one.
3.2.4 What about wages?
Wages are driven by supply and demand of the relevant labour force, whether skill
based or task based, but also driven by demand. As noted by Brynjolfsson & Mitchell
(2017) the elasticity of labor supply responds to wages. If there are many people who
already have the requisite skills, then supply can be fairly elastic and wages may not
fluctuate much, if at all, even in response to fluctuations in demand. In contrast, if
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skills are more difficult to acquire, then changes in demand may be reflected more
in wages rather than in employment (Brynjolfsson Mitchell, 2017).
3.2.5 What about productivity?
Currently, the world is in an era of low productivity growth (Autor & Salomons,
2018). This is perhaps in spite of the only increasing adoption of algorithms. It cer-
tainly seems that we are on the cusp of widespread adoption of algorithms across
many different fields, different professions, and different levels of cognitive ability.
"We thus appear to be facing a redux of the Solow (1987) Paradox: we see transfor-
mative technologies everywhere but in the productivity statistics."(Brynjolfsson co,
2018, pp.2)
3.2.6 What about job polarization?
Job polarization is a continuing trend whereby traditional middle-class jobs that re-
quire a middle level of skills are disappearing across developed economies (Goos
and Manning, 2007). With the advent of algorithms, it is possible that this will
be further exacerbated. (Açemoǧlu & Autor, 2011). Job polarization contributes
to inequality by broadening the wage gap between high and low skilled workers
(Goos and Manning, 2007). It is possible that humans augmented with algorithms
could present a new middle-class, middle-ground of the labour force. “As routine-
based positions decline due to automation, middle-skilled workers will likely find
themselves moving toward less skilled, service-oriented positions, leading to further
wage erosion.”(Wright Schultz, 2018)
While these technologies may make society richer overall, unless the right gover-
nance structures are put in place, certain segments of society are likely to receive
most of the benefits while others suffer most of the costs (Frey and Osbourne, 2017).
This is not the tide that lifts all boats, if it lowers the real wage and creates large
swathes of unemployment.
3.2.7 Will we tax robots?
When considering job polarization, or mass unemployment, or the universal basic
income, one answer people postulate is that there could be a redistribution of income
from algorithms, or robots, to labour through taxation. Taxation of robots could dis-
courage a full implementation of automation, and thus encourage companies to cre-
ate work that human beings could do alongside, or with algorithms (Guerreiro et
al., 2017). Korinek & Stiglitz, 2017, aruge that since robots would be a fairly fixed
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supply, that they could be taxed in a way that tended towards a Pareto improve-
ment without creating distortions. This may also serve to fend off the Sigularity, as
mentioned later.
There is an estimated global shortfall of approximately 400,000 positions and this
is forecast to almost quadruple by 2019. Retraining and education will be the key
factors in filling the gaps created by different demands and new markets (Evans,
2017).
3.3 Are we headed towards Singularity ?
Singularity. The idea here is that rapid growth in computation and artificial intelli-
gence will cross the boundar to dominate human labor (Korinek Stiglitz, 2017). Po-
tentially economic growth could accelerate sharply as improvements cascade through-
out the global economy (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). Certainly, looking at the
control problem, we have created an invention that may continue to improve itself
into perpetuity. This is an open question that is acknowledged here, but beyond the
scope of this work.
3.4 Let’s talk general Empirics
Automation is considered a considerable threat to the future of labour and the work-
force. Frey and Osborne (2013) provides an idea of how large an impact automation
could have on the U.S. labor force, and by generalization, to other nations as well.
The authors focus particularly on ML as well as automation and propose a model to
predict the extent of computerization’s impact on non-routine tasks. After categoriz-
ing tasks by their susceptibility to automation, Frey and Osborne map these tasks to
the O*NET job survey, which provides open-ended descriptions of skills and respon-
sibilities involved in an occupation over time. They then integrate this dataset with
employment and wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to determine
what subsets of the labour market are at high, medium, or low risk of automation.
The authors finds that 47 percent of U.S. employment is at high risk of automation.
Other authors have taken this methodology and applied it to individual nations,
finding different ranges of the potential of automation. Arntz et. al, 2016, take into
account the heterogeneity of workers’ tasks within occupations, and find a much
lower rate of risk of automation: only 9 percent of jobs in their study are automatable
in the 21 OECD countries they chose, with ranges from six percent in Korea to twelve
percent in Austria. Pajarinen and Rouvinen (2014) find that over a third of of Finnish
jobs are at high risk of automation.
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FIGURE 3.6: From the Australian megatrend report on "Tomorrow’s
digitally enabled workforce." Reeson et al., 2016
Taking these ideas of the risk of automation, I decided to examine three professions
that are impactful when it comes to job creation and social mobility.
3.5 The effects of algorithms on three professions
In the following three sections I highlight the effect that algorithms have on three im-
portant fields: the medical profession, the financial profession, and the legal profes-
sion. The reason I chose these three is that they are often considered fields in which
"anyone who works hard enough" can succeed, you merely need to study hard and
work hard once you graduate. The issue that arises with the introduction of algo-
rithms in these fields is that with firms taking on less graduates, chances are the
graduates that are taken on are those that come from privileged famillies. I would
consider these three fields as equalizers of a sort, for people who come from more
’salt of the earth’ backgrounds that are looking to rise above their heritage. If these
three fields no longer serve that function then this is an extra burden of inequality
placed on society, not only the hollowing out of middle-class jobs as discussed by
Osborne & Frey (2013), but the hollowing out of upper-class opportunities for those
who are not born into that sphere.
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3.5.1 The effect on the medical profession
It is unlikely that someone will walk into a doctor’s office and be assisted by a robot.
However, video-calling a doctor is an option available in many nations, including
Norway. Babylon is a chatbot created to help diagnose patients before they see a
GP in England, and is covered by the NHS (Babylon, 2018). These are tasks that are
eroding from the purview of doctors, but perhaps in good timing, as doctors often
seem very stretched for time.
The medical profession is ripe for augmentation. The earlier example of the "su-
perhuman dexterity through tremor filtration and motion scaling that are capable
of precise manipulation in confined body cavities" (Zenati, 2001, p.1) is important to
note that with robotic assistance, surgeons can now accomplish what was previously
impossible. Dermatologists could work with a deep CNN to confirm their diagnosis
of skin cancer (Esteva et. al, 2017).
If algorithms can use NLP to read patients text or understand a recording of their
voice, couple this with a ML algorithm trained on health data collected by that indi-
vidual’s smartphone (and many others), they could perform basic diagnostics, sug-
gesting to the doctor who does see the patient a list of potential issues or symptoms
and their potential diseases ranked by likelihood or possibility. This would be al-
gorithms working with doctors. However, if algorithms end up replacing doctors,
and doctors become more like customer service representatives (with wages adjust-
ing accordingly), this amounts to displacement and leads to job polarization. The
potential is there, but the direction is unknown.
3.5.2 The effect on the financial profession
Another profession famed for rags to riches (and perhaps rags again) is finance.
With the advent of high frequency trading and algorithmic trading, stockbrokers and
professionals in finance have changed. There is an increased demand for individuals
who can write algorithms, however (Chaboud et al., 2014).
Although there are many who have positive views algorithmic trading, there are
many different studies that imply that as with all things, the truth is multi-faceted
and complicated. For example, Foucault et al., (2016) show that in a world with
no asymmetric information, the speed advantage of algorithmic traders does not
increase the basic purpose of prices which is to convey information, and rather it in-
creases adverse selection costs. Another effect as shown by Jarrow and Protter (2011)
is that algorithmic traders can end up collectively acting as one big trader, creating
price momentum and thus causing prices to be less informationally efficient, another
negative effect. Along these lines of acting at the same time, Kozhan and Wah Tham
(2012) show that algorithmic traders entering the same trade at the same time causes
a crowding effect, which in turn pushes prices further away from fundamentals.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) refers to HFT as a significant de-
velopment of market structure in recent years that can be difficult to precisely de-
fine, that represent over half of all trades daily. It generally refers to professional
traders engaging in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily ba-
sis (Menkveld, 2013). As outlined by a report issued by the SEC, the following are
characteristics attributed to proprietary firms engaged in HFT:
• the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated algorithms for gener-
ating, routing, and executing orders
• use of co-location services to minimize network and other types of latencies
• very short timeframes for establishing and liquidating positions
• the submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission
• ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible
How many stockbrokers does a firm that runs mainly on HFT need to hire? Are
there less finance graduates being hired in these firms? Questions that need more
data!
3.5.3 The effect on the legal profession
McGinnis and Russell Pearce (2014) have identified five areas of legal services in
which algorithms such as machine learning or NLP will greatly disrupt legal ser-
vices: discovery, legal search, document generation, brief generation, and prediction
of case outcomes. Many of these tasks, although cognitively taxing and requiring a
substantial education on part of the human labourer, is considered lower level legal
work, reserved for interns and recent graduates.
For these fresh graduate lawyers to gain work experience, they start at the bottom.
Interns and graduates assist in writing contracts, perform grunt work, generally put
their newly minted degrees to use by doing the legwork of the lawyers above them
(Alarie et al., 2017). With this, they learn the ins and outs of their trade, and with
more knowledge and experience can advance naturally to higher, more complex
tasks. However, this work can now be completed by many different algorithms, for
example https://www.luminance.com, a platform trained by legal experts that can
read and understand contracts, read legal documents, and be used for due diligence,
compliance, insurance, or contract management. Lumniance themselves argue that
this frees lawyers up to focus on what matters. This argument has been posited
in many industries facing disruption, for example journalism, and yet you could
consider that there are fewer journalists and job opportunities for them. Also, if
graduates are no longer receiving hands on experience in the lower levels of being
30 Chapter 3. The What and the How:
a lawyer, how will law firms transition to training graduates on higher level mat-
ters like handling clients, difficult litigation, and other tasks not currently able to be
automated. On-the-job training is crucial to understand any profession.
Another tool is Doxly: www.doxly.com, which is a secure transaction management
platform that centralizes checklists, reporting, tracking of documents, tasks, ver-
sions, and automates the entire signature management process. They take on many
tasks usually performed by transactional attorneys, again perhaps arguing that they
free the lawyers to spend more time counselling clients. One one hand, I believe this
innovations are vital for increasingly complex fields with huge amounts of data to
consider. On the other hand, if graduates are not being hired to take on these tasks
and gain necessary work experience, it becomes more difficult for graduates to break
into the industry.
Startups such as Doxly or Heretik could hire some graduates, or perhaps inspire en-
trepreneurial lawyers to create their own, but they serve to substantially shake up
the legal profession, potentially harming the economic prospects of many lawyers.
They could however, provide advantages to others: superstars in the profession will
be more identifiable and will use technology to extend their reach. Also, lawfirms
could widen their scope and offer a varied range of services previously unafford-
able by harnessing algorithms. These could serve to meet previously unfulfilled le-
gal needs (McGinnis & Pearce, 2013). Another opportunity is that lower-cost, more
easily available legal advice, legal help, and perhaps even legal representation to the
standard of previously expensive human lawyers could have a revolutionary effect
for many previously disadvantaged members of society, who could not afford legal
help, who could not understand legal processes, for whom the legal system in dif-
ferent countries and especially when they live in a country of not their birth origin
where they are not native speakers.
Notably, lawyers are unlikely, much like doctors, to cease to exist when it comes
to the human factor. Algorithms are unlikely to create emotional bonds with clients,
and perhaps human counselors are more persuasive against clients that are not mak-
ing decisions to serve their best interests (McGinnis & Pearce, 2013).
There is even a Norwegian startup in this space: https://lawtechfactory.com . They
create "automated solutions using state-of-the-art machine learning and natural lan-
guage processing technology."
3.5.4 But we are lacking data!
Law, medicine, and finance are three fields in which anyone who studies and works
hard enough has the potential to improve their standing in society. With the rise of
algorithms, this could create further displacement and erode possibilities for social
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mobility through job polarization and a lack of opportunities for those entering the
three big fields without family contacts.
Although there is a deluge of data in other areas, firm-level data on the adoption
of algorithms is lacking. This data would allow researchers to address a host of
questions about the extent of adoption of algorithms, under what conditions they
are adopted, effects on productivity, what type of firms invest in algorithms, market





Policy for the uncanny valley
I have noticed that, in climbing toward
the goal of making robots appear like a
human, our affinity for them increases
until we come to a valley, which I call
the uncanny valley.
Masahiro Mori
4.1 The state of algorithms, now
Diagnose skin lesions better than dermatologists (Esteva et al., 2017).
Write contracts better, faster, and cheaper than lawyers (Alarie et. al, 2018).
Stocks traded smarter than stockbrokers (Chaboud et al., 2014).
While some fear that robots are coming for physical jobs, they fail to notice that
algorithms are already here for the cognitively tasking ones. Task by task. 1
In this chapter I detail a number of important questions raised by the potential
widespread adoption of algorithms, discuss some policy recommendations, and
suggest further avenues of future research, ideally performed alongside algorithms.
4.1.1 Who reserves judgement?
There are already algorithms making decisions. Online credit card applications are
a good example. If you apply for a credit card with Bank Norwegian, you will get
an approval or rejection almost instantaneously. There is not a person sitting there
at all hours of the day and night making those judgments. An algorithm makes the
decisions. The algorithm exercises judgment on a person’s credit score and their
income, as reported to the Norwegian tax authority, and based upon set parameters.
The algorithm then approves or rejects the application. However, in this case, it is not
1How do you remove an abortion law? One paragraph at a time.
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FIGURE 4.1: From Masahiro Mori’s work in 1970 which coined the
term the "Uncanny Valley" - bukimi no tani genshō
necessarily looking at a judgment, in terms of Agrawal et al. (2017), p.6: "Judgment
is the ability to recognize hidden attributes when they arise.”
This question is related to the study of Aghion and Tirole (1997) of an investigation
of formal versus real authority. In that context, someone who collected the infor-
mation would report that information to a superior, who may also collect their own
information. Part of the role of the boss, or person in charge, is that they cannot
pay attention to everything. Hence, the subordinate might be able to exercise real
authority over some of the decisions. Moreover, because the subordinate may pri-
vately gain from that authority, they would have a greater incentive to collect infor-
mation. How would algorithms be given authority, and how would we recognize
those limitations and plan accordingly?
The ethics of algorithms is a difficult subject. Algorithms have increased autonomy
over decisions that have previously been the purview of human beings (e.g., the hir-
ing and firing of employees, whether or not to grant large loan or grant applications,
who an autonomous car would kill in a fatal accident). Perhaps some of these sit-
uations are misnomers. After all, are you going to judge two people against each
other if they make different, subjective decisions? How do you decide which is the
preferable subjective decision?
It is difficult to find how much autonomy human beings will retain over decisions
made by AI. If a machine learning application that is taught dermatology provides a
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different diagnosis than expert human doctors, whom do you consider the expert? Is
that a decision that needs to be made by the patient? Is there a third, “blind” expert
introduced to act as a judge between the experts and the AI, without knowing who
chose what? AI will be trained on human data, in that humans created the contracts
that AI learns from, or the laws and legal cases and legal precedents it refers to. Does
this mean it will start to write legislation?
What human beings do have control over is in the very inception, in the creation of
the original motivations of any kind of artificial type of intelligence. Perhaps even
algorithms could regulate their own moral code to a higher degree and a better un-
derstanding that human beings. "To the extent that ethics is a cognitive pursuit, a
superintelligence could also easily surpass humans in the quality of its moral think-
ing. However, it would be up to the designers of the superintelligence to specify
its original motivations." (Bostrom, 2003, p277). The logic suggests that if we direct
the path of superintelligence through its initial, we could have some influence on its
path and destination.
Where will the limits of the autonomy of AI lie?
4.1.2 What do we do with the replaced?
What will happen to all of the college graduates when different firms no longer
hire people for the grunt work that algorithms can perform for them instead? More
broadly, as algorithms begin to diffuse across the economy, it seems likely that a lot
of people will get pushed into new positions and many people will be laid off. Just
as changing organizational processes takes time, it will also take time to remake the
social context in ways that will make it possible to handle these dislocations. With-
out these kinds of investments (e.g., in education, in relocation assistance), there is a
real risk of a public backlash against AI that could dramatically reduce its diffusion
rate.
As Rebecca Henderson (2017) notes in her comment on Brynjolfsson et al. (2014),
that AI will take time to diffuse because its adoption will require mastering “ad-
justment costs, organizational changes and new skills.” Robort Solow’s famous 1987
quote comes into play again, wherein you cannot see change in productivity stat-
stics until firms have actually adopted the changes, created organizations processes
around them, and of course most importantly hired human capital that can actually
master it. The widespread adoption of algorithms does not only depend on its diffu-
sion but the development of the organizational and human assets to exploit its full
potential.
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Disruption is an important piece to study, even if 25 years ago Henderson submitted
a paper that "suggested that incumbents were fundamentally disadvantaged com-
pared to entrants because they were constrained by old ways of acting and perceiv-
ing" and received a rather dismissive letter in return: “Dear Rebecca, you have writ-
ten a paper suggesting that the moon is made of green cheese, and that economists
have too little considered the motions of cheesy planetoids.....”(Henderson, 2017,
p.2) Although Herbert Simon wrote about organizational change in the 1980s it has
taken quite an amount of time to diffuse into economic lexicon, perhaps much like
the adoption of algorithms will. After all, academia is not profit-maximizing, so in-
centives would need to be clear and retraining present to teach academics how to
master algorithms.
There needs to be serious study to consider how firms will handle organizational
change when it comes to the increasing adoption of algorithms, and how that will
affect labour and wages. “As routine-based positions decline due to automation,
middle-skilled workers will likely find themselves moving toward less skilled, service-
oriented positions, leading to further wage erosion.”(Wright Schultz, 2018, p.4) Al-
though economists can model productivity effects, or automation effects, or argue
for when wages may rise or fall, serious data is needed to understand the best forms
of implementation moving forward. Perhaps this data is best sorted and analyzed
by an algorithm coded by motivated economists.
FIGURE 4.2: The tendency towards disruption by algorithms. From
Wright & Schultz, 2018
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4.1.3 Privacy in the age of AI
Another question of dealing with algorithms is how will a person’s privacy be han-
dled when there are fewer and fewer human beings involved in processes? As out-
lined by Tucker, 2017, there are three ways in which a person’s data and their right
to privacy is affected.
• Data Persistence: What enters the internet may never end up deleted, perhaps
even longer than the person that created it.
• Data Repurposing: "Once created, such data can be indefinitely repurposed.
For example, in a decade’s time, parking habits may be part of the data used
by health insurance companies to allocate an individual to a risk premium."
(Tucker,2017,pp.3)
• Data Spillovers: When you submit your DNA to a geneology database to find
out more about your ancestors, about family members, and about your genetic
makeup, that data can be used to catch criminals or people who have not con-
sented to having their DNA in a database by virtue of being related to you
(GEDMatch, 2018).
Even if you never agree to placing any information on your self on the internet,
by virtue of being related to someone who uploads their genetic data to a geneology
database, this may be unavoidable. Persistence and repurposing then raise questions
for how to end up avoiding a superintelligence, especially if we keep feeding it data.
4.2 How close are they, really?
The productivity paradox still reigns supreme. That the technology exists does not
make it widely available. That it is widely available does not make it successfully im-
plemented. Secondary innovations are arguably as important as the primary ones.
Australia, like Norway, is a small country on the global stage, and like Norway con-
siders the future through the lens of setting examples but not necessarily steering
the future. In the megatrend report by Reeson et al. (2016) on "Tomorrow’s digitally
enabled workforce", the authors note that although Australia’s workforce is contin-
ually changing and evolving, this current period in history is different. There are a
combination of factors at play that create a potential ’perfect storm’ for massive and
speedy transitions than previously experienced.
The full impact of exponential and/or steep growth in computing power, device con-
nectivity, data volumes and artificial intelligence is yet to be felt within Australia’s
labour market. Many reports, from the OECD (2016) to Frey and Osborne (2013)
imply that there are a large cohort of existing jobs that are likely to be automated
which means many new jobs need to be created to take on the displaced workforce.
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Perhaps a solution that the market itself offers is peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplace (Up-
work, Freelancer, Kaggle, Task, Rabbit et al.), where freelancers or skilled individu-
als can find short-term contracts or projects to work on (Reeson et al., 2016) Another
point to note is that we live in an increasingly globalised labour market where indi-
viduals have the opportunity to work remotely. For example, a program called Tulsa
Remote, sponsored by the George Kaiser Family Foundation, offers 10 000 USD up-
front to skilled indivudals to move to the city of Tulsa and bring with them their
remote work (Tulsa Remote, 2018). The foundation recognizes an opportunity in
reviving the city of Tulsa without necessarily creating new job opportunities there.
Perhaps remote villages and towns in Norway could take inspiration.
Much like Norway, Australia is entering a post-mining boom era of its economic
development and so needs to be positioned for diversification into services, knowl-
edge, and innovation exports. Norway, like Australia, is a small nation that can be
well positioned to pivot to new opportunities. As relatively small economies, Aus-
tralia and Norway will both likely be a net importers of technology outside of their
specific realms of expertise (for example off-shore drilling platforms in Norway). For
knowledge and technology, large global platforms that have scaled offer far greater
affordability, and can be adapted to local conditions.
Workforce transitions, in how individuals move from one job to another and how
industries move from one labour market structure to another, are crucial to under-
stand and plan for. Even if change is inevitable, the future of work and working
with algorithms is not. For smaller countries with highly educated workforces, a
narrative of the future can be constructed that empowers individuals, communities,
companies and governments to better identify and implement transition pathways
that achieve good outcomes. Job changes and multiple careers in a working life are
far more likely to become the norm; this pattern has been happening for a while.
Workers will need the capability to handle a career dead-end (or job loss) and create
their own job in another space. This is a truth facing even academics, or graduates
with PhDs no longer finding professor-track positions. To be a resilient individuals,
you need to develop character traits and mindsets which are learned over time and
potentially through difficult experiences. These are not necessarily easily built into
a structured curriculum. Soft skills may be increasingly vital for people to thrive in
tomorrow’s labour market (Stevenson, 2018).
At a panel of economists questioned about the future of work, one economist noted
that those not in the labour force are often unhappy and have an inclination to
take opiods (Stevenson, 2018). Naturally, this perhaps is true for particular cohorts,
and looking at feminist economics it may not be the only way to describe society.
I agree though, that the notion of work as purpose or meaning in many people’s
lives (Morse Weiss, 1955) is crucial in understanding the future of how economies
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will adopt algorithms, and the potential effects it may have on societies around the
world.
4.2.1 What will the use us for?
That algorithms can take on what we consider to be cognitively taxing tasks, does
not mean that there are tasks beyond them (Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2017). Three
areas in which algorithms are lacking prowess, as outlined in the OECD Report on
Automation, Skills Use, and Training (2018). The first is social intelligence, the abil-
ity to effectively negotiate complex social relationships, whether that means caring
for others, recognising cultural sensitivities, understanding power dynamics, and
other interpersonal aspects of working life. Naturally, the question arises of the al-
gorithmic equivalent: how well do algorithms “talk” to one another? How well can
they be integrated? Will an algorithm specialize in integrations between the multiple
tasks that create a job?
Another field that human beings will take the lead is creativity. Cognitive intelli-
gence, any type of considerable generalization, and application outside of strictly
narrow fields (unless by perhaps an integration between millions of narrow algo-
rithms), is lacking in today’s abilities algorithms and artificial intelligence. Algo-
rithms can complete one task well, often better than their human counterparts, with
enough training and enough good data (Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2017). However,
creativity involves creating new connections, seeking new patterns, copying and
melding ideas into a brand new solution, often never before imagined or under-
stood. This is something human beings excel at. Complex reasoning is another
questionable concept for algorithms.
Finally, although Boston Dynamics has created many an amazing performance, per-
ception and manipulation is still out of reach when it involves physical tasks carried
out in an unstructured work environment (Murray, 2017). Robots would need sit-
uational awareness, and if working alongside humans, efficient use of algorithms
such as NLP to follow and understand human direction (Duvallet, 2015). Robots
can backflip, or walk down stairs, but stacking boxes onto a palette, and loading
those onto a truck is a mammoth task for an algorithm/robot combination2(Nelson
et al., 2019). The implementation of robots into the workforce is a topic outside the
scope of this investigation, but it bears mentioning.
There are many opportunities to work with algorithms, many professions would
benefit from people having more face to face time with individuals that they work
with or for, rather than with the documents or tasks around those individuals. How-
ever, this is a philosophical shift for many professions to take, and difficult to see if
2I have avoided talking about robots as much as possible in this work as I have wanted to focus
on the effect that algorithms themselves will have on the future of labour without falling into the
dystopian traps of science fiction.
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FIGURE 4.3: Tricking a clever algorithm. From Nguyen et al., 2015
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it will be in the interest of profit-maximizing firms to do so, if the easier and cheaper
option is merely to replace workers.
4.2.2 Opportunity and risk are indeed twins: with new opportunities
come new problems.
There was an incident on the U.S. stock market on May 6th, 2010 which has since
been named the "Flash Crash" where, in the course of around 30 minutes, U.S. stock
market indices, stock index futures, options, and exchange-traded funds experi-
enced a sudden price drop of more than 5 percent, followed by a rapid rebound.
It was a brief period of extreme volatility (Kirilenko et al., 2017). Incidents like this
highlight that a world increasingly run with and by algorithms could have reper-
cussions when it comes to increased volatility in stock markets, which play a role in
political choices that individuals make.
Although algorithms bring new opportunities, like algorithmic trading or better un-
derstanding of the masses of data that are created each day, by allowing algorithms
increased decision and judgement power, there is an increased risk of volatility or
even injury. If the robot surgeon hand makes a mistake, who is liable? If the algo-
rithm misses a clause in a contract, will the intern be trained well enough to pick it
up? It is perhaps a little too easy to argue for the irrelevance of the human labourer
in a world of algorithms that can end up with serious biases (Armantier & Copeland,
2012).
4.3 Regulation
Multi-national corporations have made an artform of successfully playing different
governments against each other to achieve their best terms, whether it comes to tax-
ation, law, or regulation. With algorithms taking over more and more current tasks,
how this will play out has a playbook. What is the dream of a corporation, if not to
have no staff? No labour costs? No pesky unions, or safe working laws, or employee
satisfaction, or holidays, or payroll, indeed there is much to be free of with a skeleton
staff. With the exponential growth of algorithms, the tasks they can complete, and
the breadth of application, this is sooner reality than science fiction. Regulation, and
good regulation that understands the risks and benefits of algorithms as applied in
different professions or to different tasks will be perhaps the only way to manage
this once the floodgates well and truly open.
However, if you are to regulate all of these narrow intelligences, you need to under-
stand it. And what better way to understand it than with an algorithm designed for
doing so. What an algorithm will soon do better than researchers, than academics,
than government officials is to find and process information. Naturally there are
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people at one end asking questions, or seeking information, but even with enough
minds to process all the complexities that arise from deep interference of algorithms,
this is also a matter of time. In order to understand the advances of algorithms into
different tasks, an algorithm will need to do that research. It will need to process
many different kinds of information to show regulators what areas are changing
quickly and need attention in order for the transition, if there is one, to artificial in-
telligence in different professions is as smooth as possible. It will be necessary in the
effective regulation of algorithms.
There has been little technology that has been so broad in scope as algorithms. To
regulate algorithms, to understand all the different and perhaps insidious influences
or changes that come, even corporations such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and
IBM work through Partnership on Artificial Intelligence to Benefit People and So-
ciety (Wright & Schultz, 2018). This partnership aims to address ethical issues and
improve society’s understanding of artificial intelligence. This is not a zero sum
game, AI used to process information will be incredibly beneficial and productive
for many professions that are built up of tasks involving research and calculations.
With the correct checks and balances, government committees, task forces, and in
the future certainly departments and ministerial positions will be important in a co-
hesive transition to a society where AI and algorithms play a vital role in our daily
lives.
4.4 The control problem
Writing about algorithms and about artificial intelligence lends itself to big, often
scary ideas lurking in the corners. One of these ideas is the control problem. How
do you build a superintelligence that does not harm the project’s interests (Bostrom,
2014)? The control problem arises when there is no way for a human to insure
against existential risks before an artificial general intelligence AGI becomes super-
intelligent, either by controlling its capabilities or its motivations (Gans, 2018).
One classic example was presented by Bostrom (2003), called the paperclip problem.
Even when an AGI has a goal that is arbitrary, such as manufacturing as many pa-
perclips as possible, if an AGI is superintelligent it can quickly spiral out of control,
for example transforming the earth and space into paperclip manufacturing facili-
ties. That the AGI did not start with a motive anywhere near domination does not
mean it would not result in monopolizing all available resources. The idea goes as
dark as to say that this could even result in the subjugation or elimination of humans
by the paperclip making AGI to achieve its goal. Bostrom (2014) presents that AI re-
searchers are yet to sufficiently come up with methods of control that would ensure
such outcomes did not take place.
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The control problem is a superintelligence version of the classic principal-agent prob-
lem whereby a principal faces decisions that seek to ensure an agent with different
goals acts in the interest of the principal (Gans, 2018). Although this problem is
familiar to economists, theory is imperfect and ill-equipped to resolve the risks as-
sociated with control of a superintelligence. For those most fearful of this, they say
that the only tool that can prevent harm by a powerful agent is the removal of their
agency. To remove the agency of a superintelligence would be to not create it at all
(Barrat, 2013).
It is a strange sort of argument indeed. But a novel way to handle the control prob-
lem of artificial intelligence. There are many lenses and frames through which you
can understand algorithms and AI, and the control problem is a good model to un-
derstand the consequences and complexity that arise from having an ultimate in-
vention that could improve itself recursively ad infinitum (Good, 1966).
If there is a machine, algorithm, or superintelligence that could self-improve, per-
haps the only limitation we could impose is a lack of resources available to it. The
basic idea is that machines will be able to self-improve by building even better ma-
chines or as in the case of the paperclip problem, a machine that works out ways
of appropriating more resources. In AI research this goes under the term recursive
self-improvement (Yudkowsky, 2007). The central argument of Gans (2018) is that
limiting AI, for example by not allowing it property rights, would protect AI in the
sense that human beings would allow it to exist. Looking at the progress of nar-
row intelligence across so many different fields, this author feels its honestly only
a matter of time and connections between algorithms before a superintelligence is
created.
4.5 Global reactions
FIGURE 4.4: Global reponses to AI. Dutton, (2018)
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Across the world, different governments are reacting to changes in their workforces,
in global competition, and in attempting to understand the future of automation and
of work. For example, in Chine, Baidu (China’s Google), Tencent (China’s Facebook
on steroids), and the Chinese government have created the Chinese Panopticon (Tan
& Ding, 2018). The Chinese government seem well aware of the fact that AI technolo-
gies have the potential to further entrench the near-monopoly power of technology
giants.
Apps such as Tencent’s Wechat, what Facebook aspires to be, can collect data on
user searches, navigation patterns, reading interests, and payments in a single plat-
form. This "superapp" could swallow up products that provide even the most spe-
cialized AI products and services (Tan & Ding, 2018). Nations such as China could
be more willing to designate certain large companies as national champions as it is
potentially easier to manage a smaller number of AI giants than a higher number of
specialized firms (Dutton, 2018).
Moving across the Pacific Ocean, Canada was the first nation to create an AI strategy,
with the Pan-Canadian AI strategy over five years as outlined in the 2017 federal
budget. Led by CIFAR, the 125 million dollar plan outlines different areas to focus
on: increased education, create interconnected nodes of scientific excellence, develop
global thought leadership, and support a national research community on artificial
intelligence (CIFAR, 2018).
Leaping over Canada across the Atlantic, we come to the EU, where the aim is to
increase the EU’s technological and industrial capacity while harnessing and en-
couraging AI uptake by the public and private sectors. Another key initiative as
outlined in the Communication on Artificial Intelligence for Europe (2017) is to pre-
pare the citizens of the EU for the socioeconomic changes brought about by AI, many
of which I have outlined earlier in this work. Finally, it is key to ensure that an appro-
priate ethical and legal framework is in place. Vital initiatives include a commitment
to increase the EU’s investment in AI from 500 million in 2017 to 1.5 billion by the
end of 2020, and the creation of the European AI Alliance (AI for Europe, 2017).
In the USA, multinational corporations rule. All of Silicon Valley is in on the al-
gorithms game. The government of the United States recently announced a Select
Committee on Artificial Intelligence which will operate through the National Sci-
ence and Technology Council (White House, 2017). They see the potential of har-
nessing AI: “Artificial intelligence holds tremendous potential as a tool to empower
the American worker, drive growth in American industry, and improve the lives of
the American people. Our free market approach to scientific discovery harnesses
the combined strengths of government, industry, and academia, and uniquely posi-
tions us to leverage this technology for the betterment of our great Nation.” Michael
Kratsios, Deputy Assistant to the President for Technology Policy. (White House,
2018).
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The purpose of the committee seems to be to understand how AI will affect Amer-
ican society from an employment, economic, national security, and health perspec-
tive. Understanding AI is an important and vital step for all governments around
the world to take, and although the U.S. specifically states that “Overly burdensome
regulations do not stop innovation—they just move it overseas.” there is certainly
regulation that will need to be enforced to best understand and harness AI while
protecting workers from excessive displacement.
Countries in Scandinavia must seriously consider how they treat algorithms. The
decisions on the vast changes coming to many people in the workforce need to be
planned today. Can a government own algorithms? Can they outsource parts of
them to the private sector? What will the public sector look like, run by algorithms?
In Australia, the greatest problem will be internet speed. There cannot be a future of
algorithms and cloud computing without wildly faster internet. Perhaps algorithms
can be created that adapt to the conditions of slower, intermittent, or unreliable in-
ternet. This may be an entirely new industry that forms.
If countries with slower internet, and perhaps no realistic nor cost effective to quickly
create faster internet, want to use algorithms, there will be private actors that solve
this equation in any number of ways. For example, Babylon, the UK health app that
allows patients in the NHS to videocall doctors, has an agreement with the Govern-
ment of Rwanda to assist in providing healthcare. As smartphones are not widely
available in the nation of Rwanda, patients call nurses who work with the chatbot,
asking questions as prompted by the screen and interpreting answers given by pa-
tients in a way that the app understands (Babylon, 2018). Initiatives such as this may
help thwart the productivity effect as Zeira, and later Açemoǧlu & Restrepo outline
of increased capital availability as a means of widening between nation diferences
(Zeira, 1998).
4.6 What’s next?
There are many questions that this thesis only touches on. These questions may
need to be explored in more depth. Other questions are already being explored in
the fields of AI. These questions include the future of work and the future of society.
It is recommended that economists consider policy advice for governments on the
topics of AI, algorithms, and the replacement of labour. Although this work is op-
timistic in how the role of work will change, the quantity of work available for a
growing global population is a very pertinent question.
Robots were not covered in the scope of this thesis. However, there are many ques-
tions around how robotic labour will be used in the future. There are many difficult,
menial tasks, often dangerous tasks, that are well suited to robotic work. These tasks
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are often comprised of many low-paid, labour-intensive jobs, which are a broad part
of the employment opportunities for many people around the world without an
extensive formal education. Without access to higher education or opportunities re-
lated to higher education, what type of work will these people have to do in the
future?
The discussions around a Universal Basic Income also needs to assess situations and
relevance to the societies of people who are highly educated, but lack opportunities
(Laukkanen et al., 2018). This lack of opportunities may be due to their local econ-
omy not offering these opportunities or because many of the tasks that comprise
their job role have been replaced by algorithms, AI, robots, or a combination. Thus,
there is less demand for their skilled labour. More research is needed in the areas
of re-skilling, re-training, career changes, and lifelong education. These studies are
important to determine how future high-level economies function. Algorithms will
cover a lot of the grunt-work type tasks, while humans will conduct the creative
tasks. With many new fields opening up, and the accelerated progress of economies
and societies, humans will need frequent education and up-skilling, a substantial in-
crease in the soft skill of career resilience (Rossier et al, 2017). It might be that taking
ongoing higher education is an essential task in a corporate setting.
Governments need to consider the ownership of algorithms, AI, and robots. Algo-
rithms, AI and robots may be labour, or labour-replacing. If this power is in the
hands of multinational corporations, there may be little interest in a nations’ wellbe-
ing (provided you can make the assumption that a government has an interest in a
nations’ wellbeing, especially for the majority of its citizens). This may result in an
acceleration of income and social inequality if algorithms and the subsequent wealth
they generate is held in by a shrinking group of technocrats.
If people are to work alongside algorithms, the public sector is an excellent place for
that to occur. Naturally, there are always incentive issues with public funding in that
corporations often deliver better products with higher incentives.
If the governments major income source is taxation, then governments naturally
have a high incentive to keep people working. However, they need to balance taxa-
tion with work coming from sources outside of the government, unless the product
the people employed by the government.
4.6.1 We’ve been at crossroads before
Massive change can occur within generations. With the second world war, women
were "freed" to work. This change led to a massive demographic shift, where a
majority of women work outside of their households (Stevenson, 2008). Technolog-
ical change occurred in a way that crowded out homemade goods and crowded in
women’s labor force participation (Stevenson Wolfers, 2007). Professions have also
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changed. New job titles abound, and many more aspects of work are now measured
(Stevenson, 2008). The industrial revolution, then digitalization, and now the prolif-






In this investigation I have discussed at length the effect that algorithms are having
on the workforce through different empirical sources. The future is always closer
than we think, and understanding how algorithm will affect the workforce is pre-
sented through a discussion of a model of task-based automation. Although this
future is not inevitably bad, without good planning, research, data, opportunities,
and local considerations, there is a high risk of considerable worker displacement
and replacement. This is especially if individuals are not retrained to work with
algorithms. Career resillience will be vital for the near future.
We will work with algorithms. Not just for, not instead of, not against, but with
them. How algorithms differ from perhaps the personal computer or other techno-
logical inventions which have augmented human labour is that algorithms are not
limited to being just a tool. They will be more like an intelligent side-kick, or a clever
chatbot, or an analysis program that creates information for human beings to create
with, to analyze, to process, and to be wildly more productive with, given the correct
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B.0.1 Derivations for the Basic Model








if x 2 [0, I]
WZ
gZ(x)
if x 2 (I, F)
WH
gH(x)
if x 2 [F, N]
(B.1)











R if x 2 [0, I]
0 if x 2 (I, F)
0 if x 2 [F, N]
(B.3)





0 if x 2 [0, I]
Y
WZ if x 2 (I, F)
0 if x 2 [F, N]
(B.4)
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0 if x 2 [0, I]
0 if x 2 (I, F)
Y
WH if x 2 [F, N]
(B.5)
On the flipside of demand we have supply. We then aggregate each factor and make
it equal to its respective supply.




(I   N + 1) (B.6)




(F   I) (B.7)
The supply of humans who don’t work with algorithms:
L   Z = Y
WH
(N   F) (B.8)
The expression for total labour is then made up of L   Z + Z = L.
I define three task types to reflect the changing economy of the future. Labour, in
today’s economy, interacts with machines to complete the allocated tasks; indeed,
some tasks can only be completed by combining humans and computers (e.g., send-
ing an email, taking a meeting using video-calling technology, performing a mam-
mogram), let alone any necessary use of the internet for communications or infor-
mation.
I assume the supply of labour, L, and algorithms, A, are fixed and inelastic. This
allows for changes in demand to affect not the level of employment but the share
of labour in the wage and national income. Later I discuss algorithms as capital or
labour or neither, however here in the model they play the function of capital.
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Now let’s look at deriving total output.I have normalized the price of the final good
to 1 as a numeraire, following Açemoǧlu & Restrepo (2018).
Z N
N 1
lnp(x)dx = 0 (B.9)
Substituting in the expressions for p(x) the equation becomes:
Z I
N 1
[lnR   lngA(x)]dx +
Z F
I
[lnWZ   lngZ(x)]dx +
Z N
F
[lnWH   lngH(x)]dx = 0
(B.10)
Using the equations derived for A, Z, and L   Z:
Z I
N 1








[lnY   ln((L   Z)/(N   F))  lngH(x)]dx = 0 (B.11)
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The equation can then be simplified to show how aggregate output is a function of
the different productivity levels of tasks combined with the supply of different factor
inputs over the range of tasks those factor inputs cover.
Y = B
⇣ A
I   N + 1
⌘I N+1⇣ Z
F   I




Then output Y in equilibrium is a product of the different relative productivities and
the range of tasks that the different inputs of production cover.













B is a collection of terms that encompass productivities of the different factor inputs.
